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Signals passed at danger (SPADs) are amongst the most common 
incidents in railway operations and are largely attributed to human 
errors. Train protection systems have therefore been introduced to 
mitigate and prevent SPADs. Overrunning and slipping past stops, 
however, remains an issue and very little empirical research has 
looked into the effects of such partial automation systems thereby, 
especially on the train driver’s cognition, behaviour and activation 
state. To target this issue, an attention related integrative model of 
two automation phenomena as proposed by Parasuraman and Manzey 
(2010) was adapted to train driving with a German train protection 
system. Preliminary results of the derived questionnaire study on 
person and task related factors presented here revealed some effects 
regarding task-related competence and control expectations in train 
drivers that are deemed unfavourable in view of the emergence of 
attention deficits and automation errors. 
Introduction 
Even though seldom associated with severe consequences, events where a signal is 
passed at danger (SPAD) are of great concern within the railway industry.            
One reason for this concern is that SPADs are amongst the most common incidents 
in railway operations and are largely attributed to errors (in judgment or reaction) on 
part of the train driver. The German railway accident examination center (EUB, 
2012) for example, has registered 462 non-technical failure SPADs out of a total 
752 reported incidents
1 
 in 2011. 
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 An incident according to EUB is „an event in railway operations which 
compromises the safe operation of a train without eliciting direct damage of persons, 
property or environment“ 
Retrospective investigations of such events additionally uncover complex and highly 
individual interactions between various influencing factors, such as type of signal, 
time of day/ year, weather conditions, driver experience and other person related 
aspects.  Therefore causes of SPADs have been deemed “random human errors” 
from a safety point of view (Nikandros & Tombs, 2007). 
Great effort has consequently been put into the prevention of passing signals at 
warning and stopping aspects by technical solutions with assistance or automation 
character.  
Such train protection systems serve, for example, to signalise braking curves, 
monitor speed restrictions and stops at signals and initiate automatic train stops 
whenever a train driver misbehaves.   
However, although these systems have helped reducing SPAD risks and mitigating 
severity of consequences, they have not fully eliminated the issue (RSSB, 2012).
  
Catastrophic accidents, like the Hordorf train collision in Germany last year (EUB, 
2011), can still occur if a train driver fails to attend to rail-side signals where such 
technologies fail or have not yet been equipped. And even with well operating 
systems in place, inadequate interpretations of  and reactions to signal aspects can 
still cause critical incidents, for instance by “slipping past” a stop and  its associated 
safety overlap or by unjustified releases of train protection braking. 
It thus seems essential investigating the human factors in modern train driving with 
train protection systems. 
Issues 
Driving a train requires extensive knowledge, for example of operational rules and 
vehicle behaviour, and the ability to integrate various static and dynamic sources of 
information, such as schedules and track-side signals. The actual driving task is at 
the same time limited to one dimension, which is accelerating and decelerating 
(Branton, 1979). 
These contrasting aspects of the train driver task have been widely acknowledged to 
encourage “adverse mental states” that lead to critical events in the railway system 
(Baysari et al., 2008). Fatigue, monotony and boredom seem to be issues related to 
normal and thus routine operation conditions (Edkins & Pollock, 1997; Wilde & 
Stinson, 1983; Buck & Lamonde, 1993; Dorrian et al., 2006). A high cognitive 
workload, on the other hand, is also being discussed in the context of driver 
information systems (Tappan, 2011; Kecklund et al., 2001; Roth & Multer, 2009). 
What is striking is that very little empirical research has looked into the role of 
automation, especially for the train driver’s cognition, behaviour and activation 
state, and how this could be related to critical incidents.  
Even though it is very well known from the flight and process control domain for 
example, that introducing (partial) automation leads to fundamental changes in task 
structure and related demands (i.e. Bainbridge, 1983; Sarter et al., 1997; Wickens & 
Hollands, 2000), it seems that automation effects with train protection systems have 
not yet been taken into consideration when it comes to SPAD events. 
Approach 
The German train protection system “PZB 90” serves to punctually monitor speed 
and attentiveness to warnings and to cover overruns of stop signals by eliciting 
emergency braking whenever a restriction is disregarded. These interventions are 
based on track-side and on-board magnets of different hertz frequencies. 
The corresponding on-board interface consists of several indicator lamps, conveying 
status information and respective implicit calls for action (see figure 1), as well as 
three push-buttons (“order“, “alert“ and “clear“) to acknowledge signal aspects and 
also to override restrictions under certain conditions.  
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Figure 1: Schematic View of PZB Indicator Lamps (indicating train 
specifications/ target speeds on the top and supervision status on the bottom) 
In the context of rail-bound transport, where the driving task is limited to 
longitudinal control, such a system can assumedly be characterised as partial 
automation as defined i.e. by the German Federal Highway Research Institute 
(BASt), meaning that “the system takes over lateral and longitudinal control, the 
driver shall permanently monitor the system and shall be prepared to take over 
control at any time”.   
                                                          
2 “Befehl 40“ means a signal is being passed by order with a maximum speed of 40 
km/h 
This is assumed, since the train driver has to permanently monitor the interface (rail-
side signals and corresponding changes of indicator lights) and act upon its 
implications for speed adjustments. Even though these adjustments remain manually 
controlled, they are based on feedback (indication to “take over control”) and 
safeguarded against erroneous behaviour by the system.   
Confidence in this safeguarding of manoeuvres appears to be high, since the 
monitoring of brake was occasionally termed a “life insurance” by train drivers.  
Potential effects of such (partial) automation have been described in relation to 
attention by a model of Parasuraman and Manzey (2010). It comprises 
“complacency“, describing insufficient monitoring of system state  (Parasuraman, et 
al., 1993) and “automation bias“, describing the insufficient verification of system 
recommendations for action (Mosier & Skitka, 1996). According to the model, 
errors occur when the automation fails, due to a loss of situation awareness by the 
supervisory controller which traces back to inappropriate attention allocation. 
Since the model proposes various person and task related factors to influence the 
development of such attentional deficits, it was adapted to train driving with PZB 90 
train protection and a questionnaire study for assessing these factors regarding the 
train driving task was designed. 
Methodology 
In accordance to the original model and additional empirical evidence (e.g. Prinzel 
et al., 2001), it is assumed that the train driving task is acted out by train drivers with 
individual traits and attitudes that can abet automation errors.   
The survey was thus constructed to investigate relevant constructs both from a 
general and task-specific perspective. It was administered on-line with restricted 
access in order to ensure that participants were in fact professionally trained train 
drivers. 
Attitudes 
Trust was measured specifically as an attitude towards the PZB 90 system. Three of 
the five subscales of the “Human Computer Trust Scale” (HCT - Madsen & Gregor, 
2000) were therefore adapted and translated to German.  The HCT scale was based 
on a trust definition by McAllister (1995) which includes both a user’s confidence in 
the system as well as his willingness to act upon its recommendations. As this 
willingness can be linked directly to the definition of automation bias (above) and is 
supposedly related to the  more affective “believing in a system” (Madsen & Gregor, 
2000), the respective adapted subscales “personal attachment”, “faith” and 
“perceived reliability”3 were administered here.  
Five-point Likert-scale ratings of trust in particular aspects of the railway system 
were additionally obtained, ranging from “do not trust at all” (1) to “trust 
absolutely” (5). 
In order to assess tendencies towards overreliance on technical systems in train 
drivers in general, the “Complacency-Potential Rating Scale” (CPRS – Singh et al., 
1993a) was additionally used. By obtaining ratings of general statements on benefits 
and costs of automation related to trust, confidence, reliance and safety, this scale 
aims at assessing whether train drivers might be prone to complacency as the “ 
psychological state characterized by a low index of suspicion“ that Wiener (1981) 
defines.   
This is underpinned by some empirical evidence, demonstrating that scoring high on 
complacency-potential does correlate with poor monitoring behaviour, at least when 
dividing experimental groups using the median split (Singh et al., 1993b; Prinzel et 
al., 2001). These studies additionally suggest that complacency should be regarded 
as a set of attitudes, rather than a trait, as it showed no correlation with personality 
inventories (ibid.). 
Traits 
Nevertheless, it was chosen to also investigate whether personality traits of train 
drivers would indicate effects that could foster the development of complacency and 
automation errors. 
Self-efficacy was assessed globally via the “General Self-Efficacy Scale” (GSE) by 
Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1999). The scale was developed according to Banduras 
concept that “perceived self-efficacy facilitates goal-setting, effort investment, 
persistence in face of barriers and recovery from setbacks” (quoted after ibid.). 
This in return suggests that people scoring low on self-efficacy might exhibit 
stronger passivity in everyday life. 
Krampen’s (1991) questionnaire of competence- and control-beliefs (FKK) was 
used complementary to assess the train drivers’ work-related characteristics. This 
tool was developed based on the author’s action theory personality model, which 
builds on self-efficacy (according to Bandura, 1977) and also social-learning theory 
(i.a. according to Rotter, 1955, 1982).   
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Reliability was originally thought to be a cognitive component of trust, but showed 
strong overlaps with the attachment scale (Madsen & Gregor, 2000) 
 
It consists of four conceptually independent subscales, all of which were modified 
from a generalised to a task-context specific instruction and wording: 
 Self-concept of abilities (SK-scale) 
 Internal locus of control (I-scale) 
 Socially induced external locus of control/ “powerful others control” (P-scale) 
 Fatalistic external locus of control/ “chance control” (C-scale) 
Standardised comparison values (T-values) from exhaustive reference samples are 
available for both personality tools. 
Task-context 
Participants were further asked to state their main information requirements and 




The results presented in this section have been obtained from a pilot sample of N= 7 
male train drivers. Participants were on average 31.57 years old (SD=9.89) and had 
three to 24 years of train driving experience. Four participants worked in passenger 
and three in freight train operations. Out of these, two passenger and two freight 
train drivers worked in regional transport, the rest operated in intercity transport.  
Even though this seems to be a fairly representative sample, results have to be 
considered preliminary and can only be analysed descriptively, due to the small 
sample size.  
Trust-ratings in the PZB 90 system were slightly above average on the 5 to 25 range 
for all three HCT subscales, ranging from M=17.29 for reliability and faith (SDreli= 
2.87; SDfaith= 3.04) to M=18.57 for personal attachment (SDpers= 2.15). 
Accordingly, trust in the train protection system as an aspect of the railway system 
was rated medium. The same holds for trust in track-side signalling. Trust in human 
operators on the other hand was rated fairly well -for the train driver himself as well 
as other train drivers and the control center operators (see table 1). 
Table 1: Trust-ratings for Railway System Aspects 
 Mean rating Standard deviation 
Train protection system 3.29 0.49 
Track-side signalling 3.29 0.49 
Myself 4 1 
Other train drivers 4 0.58 
Control center operators 4.29 1.11 
 
Scores regarding the general complacency-potential of train drivers were 
comparably low. With a mean of 50.71 (SD=4.96) and a median of 51, results are 
well below median split scores previously obtained by Prinzel et al. (Md=58; 2001) 
or Singh et al. (Md=56; 1993b). 
General self-efficacy perception (GSE) scores also displayed no exceptional results. 
As figure 2 shows, only one participant exhibited a normalised T-value considerably 
below the average reference sample range, as indicated by the grey bar.  
 
Figure 2: T-values of General Self-Efficacy Scores 
The results for the task-specifically modified competence- and control expectation 
questionnaire (FKK), however, revealed some effects on the subscales assessing 
“self-concept of abilities” (SK) and “powerful others control” (P).                             
Four participants scored well below the normal range for the SK scale and three 
highly above it for the P scale, with participant six exhibiting both deviations (see 
figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: T-values of Competence- and Control-Beliefs Subscales 
This is of particular interest, since the FKK questionnaire basically comprises the 
same construct as the GSE scale, but is extended by action-theory aspects and was 
instructed towards the participants’ beliefs with reference to their working-context. 
Pearson correlations were subsequently computed to investigate whether these task-
specific train driver characteristics can be related to the attitudes examined earlier.    
Significant correlations occurred only for the SK scale.   
It was positively correlated with the faith aspect of the HCT scale and negatively 
correlated with the trust-related complacency-potential of the CPRS as well as the 
trust-ratings for track-side signaling. 
Table 2: Significant Correlations with Self-Concept of Ability Scale  
   r F1,5 α-level 
HCT Faith    0.764 6.990 .95 
CPRS Trust - 0.904 22.440 .95 
Track-side Signals - 0.737 5.939 .90 
    
Discussion 
According to Krampen (1991), people who score low on the “self-concept of 
ability” (SK) scale are rather passive and observant, unsure of themselves and 
insecure in novel situations; they tend to have low self-esteem, lack ideas, know 
little options for action and see few scopes for action in difficult situations. 
Train drivers in the reported preliminary sample exhibited these tendencies in 
relation to their working life, even though their general expectations towards scope 
of action and problem-solving resources in everyday life were unobtrusive. This 
indicates that some aspects of the train driving task and working-environment do in 
fact promote passivity. Passivity, in turn, is a key factor in the loss of situation 
awareness and subsequent development of automation errors as described by 
Parasuraman & Manzey (2010). 
Since having an unfavorable concept of personal abilities is furthermore negatively 
correlated with trust in track-side signaling, it could be argued that when train 
drivers are rather passive and observant, they rely more on external system feedback 
to initiate task execution, rather than following anticipatory, self-determined 
strategies.  
This could be critical, since anticipation is a necessary element for higher level 
situation awareness and a lack thereof could promote automation errors at system 
failure (see Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).  
A similar relation can be found with trust-based complacency-potential scores, 
indicating that the lower a train driver’s expectations regarding own competence are, 
the stronger automated systems are trusted to function more accurately than a human 
operator. Taking into consideration that PZB 90 was called a “life insurance” during 
previous workplace interviews, insufficient attention to the correct functioning of the 
system (“complacent behaviour” according to Parasuraman et al., 1993) seems a 
likely consequence. 
The train drivers’ “self-concept of abilities” score is, however, also positively 
correlated with the HCT subscale of faith, meaning the conviction of a systems 
future ability to perform well, even in unknown situations.   
Considering that participants were instructed to rate the modified HCT items in 
reference to “train driving with PZB 90 train protection”, possibly intertwining the 
rating of the train protection system and the driving task, it seems likely that train 
drivers who are insecure in novel situations (low SK score) would also have little 
faith in the correct functioning of the entire system (driver-machine interaction) in 
unknown situations due to expectations of their own of shortcomings. 
Together with the high work-related scores on the “powerful others control” scale, 
identifying people who are usually not assertive at all, frequency experience feelings 
of powerlessness and helplessness, feel inferior to powerful others, see events in life 
to be caused by others and perceive themselves and their lives as strongly dependent 
on other people (Krampen, 1991), these relations indicate an overall (and possibly 
undesired) passive and dependent role of the train driver. This is also congruent with 
the fairly high ratings of trust in control center operators, since they steer train 
movements with access to anticipatory information that train drivers lack. 
 
Initial inspections of the qualitative data regarding the informational task-context 
support these assumptions. Almost every participant stated that he needed 
information about specifics of the route ahead as well as surrounding train 
movements to drive safely and efficiently, but rated availability as insufficient. Also 
the rare and deficient communication with control center operators was perceived as 
a nuisance by most participants. 
Conclusion 
The preliminary results obtained by this small pilot sample questionnaire study 
indicate that the train driving task elicits effects on task-related competence and 
control expectations which are unfavourable in view of the emergence of attention 
deficits and automation errors. 
While attitudes towards the train protection system do not seem to be a reason for 
concern, the lacking feasibility of anticipation and a proactive driving style might 
force train drivers into passivity and condition the inability to verify system 
behaviour with environmental cues. This could abet loss of situation awareness and 
thus errors upon automation failure. 
Future work is needed to determine whether the findings hold true for a larger 
sample. If this is the case, experimental work is additionally needed to assess how 
the findings have an impact on behavioural data of train drivers and whether context 
information could be presented to train drivers to allow for development of adequate 
situation awareness and an active driving style. 
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